In my post last week I talked about the three main arguments against removing the combat exclusion for women: the physical standards argument, the moral argument, and the cohesion hypothesis. My main point was that with increased research on physical standards, the intangibility of the moral argument, and increased evidence that women already are in combat, the cohesion hypothesis remains as the most significant set of arguments against GI Janes.
There are two main premises to the cohesion hypothesis: 1. cohesion is causally linked to group (in this case military unit) performance; 2. women negatively impact cohesion and thereby negatively impact troop effectiveness.
The trouble with these two premises is that they both have been largely discounted by researchers. In her 1998 article on the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy in International Security, Elizabeth Kier concludes that “the results from more than five decades of research in group dynamics, organizational behaviour, small-group research, sports psychology, social psychology, military history, and military sociology challenge the proposition that primary group unit cohesion enhances military performance.” Some research even indicates that high levels of cohesion can be detrimental to military performance as it results in conformity, groupthink, and a lack of adaptability. Many of the studies on cohesion and the military find that leadership and task- not social- cohesion have a greater impact on performance than social cohesion.
In terms of the second premise, as mentioned in the last post RAND’s major study on cohesion in 1997 found that women don’t impact group performance or military readiness. Subsequent research has reconfirmed this conclusion.
In addition to shaky (at best) premises, another major problem with the cohesion hypothesis is that it is never clear what exactly is meant by cohesion within the military context. In hopes of finding answers to this puzzle I went on a wild goose chase for cohesion clarity.
Sifting through research on social cohesion in the military I found myself sinking in masses of studies on social cohesion, citizenship and multiculturalism, group dynamics, as well as military studies on cohesion. It turns out that social cohesion is the meaningless catchphrase of the moment (I think it may have even eclipsed ’empowerment’ and ‘deliberative democracy’). Social cohesion has been used to explain the London riots, failed and successful immigration policies, winning sports team dynamics, as well as the need to keep women out of combat roles. Cohesion has also been defined as everything from: shared norms, ‘liking’ one another, commitment to a group, bonding, and trust. So how can one vague concept explain such wide-ranging and disparate policy decisions and social dynamics?
There is little substance to the cohesion hypothesis, almost no empirical evidence supporting it, and even the different forces with the US military seem to define and measure cohesion differently. I certainly don’t have the answer, but it does seem that in most contexts it is employed- especially in discussions of migrant integration, multiculturalism, and the combat exclusion- ‘cohesion’ is a red herring that distracts from attention to deeper issues of discrimination and cultural bias. In the case of the US military, cohesion is a smoke and mirrors debate that will persist until sexist attitudes and gender discrimination are addressed.
Megan, thanks for these two interesting posts. Honestly, I am not completely convinced.
I am neither into gender nor into military studies. Thus, as an external observer I just would like to understand better the issue.
My first reaction is that when it comes to war and warfare you want to implement changes ONLY and ONLY IF you are certain that they do not negatively impact military effectiveness or the risk of casualties.
I am not sure that from your posts one can draw this conclusion. For example, the RAND study shows that in NON-combat situations, cohesion is not relevant. Fine: but there is a problem of external validity and setting heterogeneity that warrants against generalizing these conclusions outside the domain of this study.
Similarly, you discuss the three arguments (physical standards, cohesion and moral) adopted to justify the exclusion of women. However, your treatment fails to address how they interact. I made a google-search and I found this work:https://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/36/2/327.fullApparently, women suffer more than men from PTS, injuries and so forth. How would this affect cohesion and morale? Given these findings, it is really warranted to lift the ban?I have no idea, but this does not exactly go in support of your position.
I have two final points:1) You accept that physical standards may justify the exclusion, but then in the conclusion of your last post you ask: “Is the US military ready to open ALL positions to women?” Either physical standards do not justify the ban – but as you admit, this is not the case – or this is a non-sequitur: you should logically allow some positions to exclude women: those where physical standards cannot absolutely be met. 2) You mention that women die in war. Somehow, you take this as a reason to lift the ban (“women have been and are operating in dangerous, physically demanding roles in the US forces.”). OK. But this is another non-sequitur. The fact that women die in war does not mean they fight or that they take leading fighting positions – or even that they should. Contractors die in war, doctors, nurses, translators, waiters, plumbers also die in war: this does not justify that they should be allowed to take fighting roles. Thanks,
Dear MD,
Thank you for your reply. You raise some very relevant questions and point to a few of the major debates surrounding this issue. The issue of women’s inclusion as a security risk is a valid one- and certainly an argument used by the US forces. If there is any chance that women could inhibit combat effectiveness, why risk it? It is difficult to show that women conclusively wouldn’t inhibit cohesion without testing they hypothesis on ground troops (and thus potentially harming them)- this is the dilemma. I would suggest that the US military could learn from the 12 other national militaries that have removed the combat exclusion for insights on this. Canada, for example, removed the exclusion in 1989 and has done extensive research on the impacts of gender integration. So far, there has been no reason to recant the policy change.
Second, you are right that women are- in general- more likely to experience PTSD and injuries while operational. We really have just learned this from Iraq and Afghanistan. This research is complicated and preliminary- it isn’t clear if there is any impact on morale, for example.
Next, I probably wasn’t clear enough on the physical standards argument. I don’t think ANYONE should be allowed to do a job if they can’t meet the physical requirements. I suspect that most members of the US forces would agree with me on that one. But, if women meet the standards (and some do) they should be allowed to do the job.
On the final point- that women die in war: I was merely trying to point ou there that women already are in combat, unofficially. So all the questions about cohesion etc become less relevant when one accepts the reality that there is no effective exclusion. The fact that women die was just merely to make it clear that they aren’t in the ‘back lines’ but very much in dangerous, and sometime in combat, roles.
Thanks again for your comments.
Megan
Small-unit cohesion has been a central military tenet for over 60 years, since Shils & Janowitz’s famous social science research article, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.” The lesson from that and subsequent studies — at least what I absorbed — is that keeping the same personnel together through training, combat, and periods of relief generates better combat effectiveness than rotation policies might outwardly seem more fair and efficient. It’s all about interpersonal relationships within the “primary group.” Expanding the cohesion concept to include cultural factors like gender or other socioeconomic aspects is demonstrably a “bridge too far” — in other words, the stability of the primary group matters far more than the makeup of that group.
Thanks for that. So would you say that effective training and procedures should make women’s inclusion a non-issue for cohesion? Can women be part of the primary group?
Of course! The military trogs who preach “small unit cohesion” ad nauseum totally miss the point about stability. For some reason they focus on homogeneity.
Canada has had women in the combat arms for over a decade. This includes serving in combat in Afghanistan. I have many friends who have served and none of them thinks anything of having women in action.
Since Afghanistan has been Canada’s longest war, I submit that this constitutes proof that a modern army can function just fine with women in the combat arms.
Women should NOT serve in combat. Neither should men.