Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Superiority for Crisis Bargaining, Part IV

Editor's Note: Back in February I riffed on a post by Erik Voeten in which Erik discussed two articles in International Organization (IO). One, by our colleague Matt Kroenig, argued that nuclear superiority gives states advantages in crisis bargaining (PDF). Another, by Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, rejects this claim (PDF). After the two posts sparked some interesting discussion--both on-...

Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Superiority, Part III

Nuclear weapons may be useful for deterrence, but can they also coerce? Our theories reach opposite conclusions: we say no; Kroenig says yes. Both sides marshal evidence to support their arguments. So who is right? Our goal in this post is to evaluate Kroenig’s empirical results and respond to his critique of our article.

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Do states with nuclear superiority gain advantages in coercive diplomacy? Two articles, one journal issue, incompatible findings. The authors debate.

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