Amid US and Israeli  strikes aimed at preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, sovereignty and security have become an urgent priority for Tehran. This has been reinforced with peace negotiations stuck in limbo while Tehran and Washington have just exchanged the biggest round of attacks in a month. Iran has moved from a state of having the potential to acquire nuclear weapons to realising that the lack of it may mean unsuccessful regime survival. If Iran acquired a nuclear bomb in these hostile circumstances, the question confronting the United States would no longer be how to prevent a nuclear Iran. It would be how to live with one.

Military operations against Tehran have also brought into focus the limits of using military force to prevent proliferation by an adversary. Iran continues to retain important scientific knowledge and blueprints for reinstating an advanced nuclear programme alongside blocking inspectors on the ground from entering its bombed nuclear facilities. In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that it has lost track of Iran’s important infrastructure for weaponisation. This sets up the perfect stage for Tehran to engage in covert and illicit proliferation networks.

The uncomfortable possibility, then, is that an Iranian bomb would not simply be the prelude to catastrophe. It could force a transition from a failing strategy of nuclear prevention to a harder but potentially more stable strategy of managing a nuclear Iran. The implications may not be as grim. A nuclear Iran would still mean that states proliferating would incur heavy costs. Furthermore, a nuclear Iran would enable the US to delink the question of Hormuz from the coercive maintenance of Tehran’s non‑nuclear status as well as strive towards an important regional balance against the monopoly of a nuclear Israel.   

 The Bomb Would Not Make Proliferation Cost-Free

If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, the first fear would be precedent: that Tehran had proved a determined state could absorb sanctions and military strikes and still reach the bomb. But Iran’s success would not erase the costs it incurred on the way. Rather, Iran would provide a more cautionary precedent than either North Korea or Pakistan. In addition to enduring economic sanctions like Islamabad and Pyongyang, Tehran would have faced coordinated US-Israeli military strikes on its nuclear facilities. This would reinforce the credibility of using collective force against states that challenge nuclear possession norms against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). These consequences of non-compliance remain grounded in historical records of Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in the 1980s and Israel using similar military force on Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in 2007.

Coercive force and crippling economic sanctions are not the only reasons for countries to often choose nuclear restraint over weaponisation. In her book, Maria Rost Rublee argues that states can be diplomatically persuaded to forego nuclear weaponisation, come to fear coercive external environments, and are often motivated to remain non-nuclear from historical experiences. Saudi Arabia illustrates how such considerations may reinforce non-nuclear choices.

Although the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, stated that “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we would follow suit as soon as possible”, Riyadh’s recent bilateral civilian nuclear agreement with Washington has certainly complicated this pathway. This agreement places Riyadh’s nuclear programme under international safeguards and limits it to the production of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Riyadh has been a trusted US ally in the Middle East, and withdrawing from its civilian nuclear agreement with Washington would be costly. Historically, the United States has never terminated a bilateral civilian nuclear agreement with a country and it would be unlikely for Saudi Arabia to break with this tradition. In fact, if Riyadh were to test an explosive nuclear device, the United States could immediately ask for the return of its technology that supported this test and terminate the agreement. Alongside facing international condemnation, Saudi Arabia would risk undermining the perception that it has heavily invested in. This has included rebranding itself as a major tourist destination, synergising Islamic values with contemporary times, and positioning itself as the world’s investment hub.

A Nuclear Iran Can Change the Hormuz Bargain

Iran seeks to engage in a protracted conflict while negotiating its nuclear programme and controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Arguments underline that a “forever war” enables Tehran to force countries to acknowledge its control over their ships, circumvent US sanctions by compelling countries to make bilateral deals, and control access to the global economy. Once Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, however, the United States would have a reason to stop treating every Iranian provocation as another opportunity to reverse Tehran’s nuclear programme. The nuclear question and the maritime-security question could finally be separated.

That would create space for an ugly bargain. A nuclear-armed Iran would force a reassessment of what is achievable in the near term. Rather than pursuing the ongoing and increasingly difficult goal of disarmament, focus could shift to securing verifiable restraint in Hormuz, limits on further nuclear expansion, and reliable mechanisms for crisis communication. Continuing to strike a nuclear-armed Iran in the hope of restoring the previous status quo could become more dangerous than negotiating the conditions under which its new nuclear status can potentially be contained.  Iran’s own record suggests that agreements are not inherently meaningless to Tehran. When the Obama administration led the successful negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Tehran’s Rouhani government, Iran respected this deal.

Multiple reports from the IAEA confirmed Iran’s compliance that included adhering to the JCPOA-prescribed enrichment limit, removing centrifuges, and limiting uranium stockpile. This adherence underlined that Iran cares about international legitimacy, fears stigma and isolation, and wants the international community to recognise its ability to run an advanced nuclear programme. Allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons lends credence to all these aspects. Emboldening the adversary can therefore translate to weakening the foundations of Iran’s leverage by eroding its narrative of resistance and global disruption, removing the stigma it seeks to overcome, and exposing it to the burdens of full nuclear responsibility.

Trapping Tehran in a cycle of accountability as a normal nuclear power, rather than treating it as a rogue state that could potentially go nuclear, would force Tehran to demonstrate maturity and restraint. This could also have important implications for allowing safe passage for vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. A nuclear Iran’s attack on vessels becomes more visible and directly undermines Tehran’s claim to responsible nuclear conduct. Historically, Iran has directly attacked military facilities of a nuclear-armed United States and Israel, which officially maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity. It also launched airstrikes against terrorist camps inside the Balochistan province of a nuclear-armed Pakistan in January 2024. Recently, Iran was accused of sinking a cargo ship under the flag of a nuclear-armed India. A nuclear Tehran would think again before provoking several nuclear enemies on multiple fronts as the escalatory ladder becomes steeper and more dangerous. With Iran losing its shield of engaging in asymmetric warfare, further attacks on vessels would signal blatant nuclear irresponsibility and more urgent responses from the international community. 

Regional Dynamics

With Israel maintaining its nuclear ambiguity in the Middle East, a nuclear weaponised Iran contributes to the regional balance of power. Against propositions of how nuclear weapons in the hands of an irrational Iran could destabilise the Middle East, several contrasting parallels on stability can be drawn from India and Pakistan as two mutually hostile nuclear powers in South Asia. Mutual vulnerability to nuclear strikes could mean a more rapid de-escalation of tensions as compared to Israel’s 12‑day war in 2025 or its February–March 2026 campaign against Iran. Against this timeline, the most recent conventional military exchanges between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor only lasted for 88 hours before a ceasefire was negotiated.

In controlling proliferation in the past, Israel has been willing to precisely strike Iraq, Syria, and Iran because these states could not retaliate with nuclear weapons. If Iran crossed the nuclear threshold, however, the risks facing Israel would fundamentally change. Waltz argues, Israel and Iran would deter one another because the prospect of devastating retaliation would make direct conflict prohibitively costly. In this view, Iran’s weaponisation would not simply constrain Tehran but also discipline Israeli behaviour by replacing preventive strikes with the caution produced by mutual nuclear vulnerability.

If Iran were to cross the nuclear threshold and abandon its status as a conventional power, its survival‑sensitive regime would face powerful incentives to de‑escalate with Israel and the United States. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability and assured destruction, Tehran would be compelled to manage crises far more cautiously. In fact, the perception of an irrational Tehran that has launched missiles all across the Middle East and is now further emboldened with nuclear capabilities helps deter future operations against Tehran from Tel Aviv and Washington.

Fears that Tehran might proliferate nuclear capabilities to its affiliated proxy groups also remain limited. With regime survival at the core of Tehran’s strategy, it remains aware that high-casualty attacks by its proxies can often be traced back to their sponsor, leaving Tehran subject to the logic of deterrence. Non-state actors with nuclear capabilities also risk retaliation, loss of control, and exposure to radiological risks. Furthermore, without state support and millions of dollars in investment for appropriate training and infrastructure to assemble and operate a nuclear device, non-state actors are severely restricted in their knowledge capacities.  

The previous Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, coupled with its attempt to negotiate a replacement deal, and repeated attempts to disarm a nuclear-armed Iran by force could precisely create the regional catastrophe that a prevention policy against Tehan’s nuclear bomb was designed to avoid. A nuclear Iran would not inevitably unleash regional chaos. Instead of the US and Israel perpetuating a cycle of strikes and sanctions, Iran’s new nuclear power status could incentivise restraint by imposing the burdens of nuclear responsibility. This includes heightened visibility, accountability, and immediate de-escalation. Moreover, regional proliferation cascades remain unlikely. Saudi Arabia’s binding civilian nuclear agreement with Washington and its strategic rebranding as a global investment hub raise the costs of weaponisation. Ultimately, a nuclear Iran may paradoxically stabilise the region by replacing ambiguous resistance with transparent deterrence. This could force existing hostilities onto a steadier, if uneasy, diplomatic path.