Breaking news (via Chirol), and it isn’t good:
“At least 20 people have been killed in at least seven blasts on trains in the Indian financial capital, Mumbai (Bombay), police say.”
If confirmed, these strikes are reminiscent of the Madrid and London bombings. But, as Chirol notes, the added danger of these attacks is that if any links are established between the bombs and Pakistan would likely spark an international crisis between the two nuclear powers. Always a good thing.
Filed as: Terrorism
In the comments section to Peter’s latest post about the after-effects of North Korea’s missile test I noted that I was puzzled as to why China has not done more to compel Kim Jong-Il. Given the steps suggested in Japan recently to shift their defensive posture to one that would operationally and legally allow them to carry out preventive strikes against the North (not to mention grumblings about a Japanese nuclear program) it would seem that China’s own interests in not seeing such a shift in Japan would motivate it to act.
Nayan Chanda offers a thought, one that slipped my mind when writing my comment, as to why they haven’t:
“To be sure, China can halt the trains that regularly carry food and fuel to the intransigent socialist brother. But such an action could have unpredictable and undesirable consequences for China. If Chinese pressure resulted in a peaceful collapse of the regime, it would release a human wave of starving refugees across the border and into the Sea of Japan. An international humanitarian intervention in a chaotic North Korea or a rushed reunification with the South might ensue, which could bring American or other foreign forces right up to the Chinese border — a dreaded prospect for Beijing.”
The potential collapse of the DPRK, the massive inflow of refugees, the possibility of a unified Korea, and the potential for direct intervention by the US and possibly Japanese forces right off their border would certainly act as a disincentive to apply the kind of pressure China is capable of. It would appear that China holds sway over the North, but its the equivalent of the ‘nuclear option’, one that could seriously affect China’s strategic situation if employed. Assuming for the moment that this is true I am not sure how the US goes about convincing the Chinese to alter their stance. Is there some kind of a contingency plan that could be cobbled together in which the US and Japan are not part of a post-DPRK stabilization force? Would either agree to such a thing? How could the US and Japan credibly committ to such a reservation? How about one that credibly prevents the type of refugee crisis that Chinese leadership dreads?
Filed as: North Korea, China, Diplomacy, Proliferation