On June 19, 2026, as American and Iranian negotiators were set to meet in Switzerland to work through the terms of a fragile memorandum of understanding, Israeli jets struck Hezbollah targets in Nabatiyeh and the Bekaa Valley. Iran responded by skipping the Switzerland talks and announcing it would close the Strait of Hormuz again, citing Israeli violations of the agreement, which had specified that fighting in Lebanon must end. The ceasefire seemed unsure and on the verge of breaking down, and the incident handed Trump a public embarrassment.

For a while, the 60 day ceasefire continued to remain notionally in effect, even as there were material violations with several tankers bombed in the strait of Hormuz, US revocation of Iranian rights to sell oil as well as attacks on Iranian targets, and Israel continuing to bomb Lebanese territory. On July 8, President Trump announced that the ceasefire was “over”.

The incident has highlighted a broader divergence in Israeli and American national interest, especially with regard to Iran but also the broader Middle East region. This essay seeks to trace the origins of this divergence, its implications and to ask whether Washington still has the leverage to discipline an ally it can no longer take for granted.

Donald Trump has inarguably been the most pro-Israel US president in recent history, overturning decades-long American policy on Iran. As far back as the Bush administration, Israel had been pushing the US to take a harder line on Iranian nuclear ambitions, calling for strikes and military action. However, Washington has consistently preferred a more diplomatic approach. The Obama administration continued this approach with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015, which imposed limits on Iranian enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.

From the start, Israel had rejected the deal as inadequate and dangerous. In Donald Trump, it found a willing partner to take a harder line. Trump tore up the JCPOA in his first term, bringing the US closer in alignment with the Israeli position. In June 2025, Trump went further than any previous American president by joining Israel in conducting direct military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.  A year later, the US and Israel started an air campaign against Iran, targeting nuclear and military facilities.

As the war dragged on, the different parties faced disproportionate losses. US allies in the Gulf region were hit the hardest, as their oil infrastructure came under attack from Iranian drone and missile strikes, while the Strait of Hormuz closed. The closure of the strait also led to global prices of crude oil skyrocketing, something that directly affects the US economy. Israel, in contrast, faced fewer comparable losses. A ceasefire agreement, facilitated by Pakistan, would have led to strikes against Iran ceasing and the reopening of the strait, bringing much needed relief for Americans at the gas pump. Unfortunately, not all parties had this as their main priority.

Importantly, Israel played no role in the negotiations leading to the ceasefire and were certainly not bound by it. However, the ceasefire’s success was contingent on America convincing Israel to constrain its actions, something that it clearly failed to do. For Israel, degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities is a key strategic goal, given both Hezbollah’s role as an Iranian proxy and the threat from its drones and short-range missiles. As such, any ceasefire that leaves Hezbollah intact will not be acceptable to Israel. A more recent Israel-Lebanon deal that is tied to the disarmament of Hezbollah might lead to an acceptable outcome for all three parties, but whether it will work remains to be seen.

The whole incident, however, has uncovered the increasing divergence of national interests between Israel and the US. Israel’s goals are maximalist; nothing less than a complete dismantling of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure would suffice for them. Going even further, for some within Israel, the ultimate goal is bringing regime change in Iran. On the US side, the reopening of the strait has been the foremost priority, following the security of its military assets in the region as well as the safety of its allies in the Gulf. While the Iranian nuclear program remains a priority, American aims are far more realistic compared to Israeli aims.

Complicating this divergence are Netanyahu’s own goals, which do not necessarily overlap with Israeli national interest. Many Israelis hold him responsible for the intelligence and policy failures that led to the October 7 attacks, and his corruption trial continues to drag on in the background. A conclusive military victory against Iran was always his best path to political recovery. That outcome has not materialized, and a diplomatic settlement that leaves Iran’s current regime largely intact and its nuclear program merely curtailed, rather than dismantled, would likely be received in Israel as a failure. Thus, Netanyahu’s incentives in Lebanon have as much to do with his domestic political situation as with Israeli national security, narrowly defined.

The potential premature collapse of the ceasefire is certainly embarrassing for Trump, and he has made his anger public. If the most pro-Israel US president is unhappy with his ally, what does it say for the broader relationship? This question needs to be answered against the backdrop of shifting American public opinion. A 2026 Pew survey found that 60 percent of US adults now hold an unfavorable view of Israel, compared to 41 percent three years ago. A Gallup poll from February of this year found that, for the first time, more Americans sympathized with Palestinians than Israelis, a significant departure from decades of consistent polling.

Most crucially, this change is consistent across partisan lines. While most Congressmen and Senators are still aligned with Israel, the next generation of politicians may not be so inclined. This is not limited to progressives alone, but even centrists like Rahm Emanuel have mentioned that the US-Israel relationship is “at a crossroads”, and talked about ending unconditional support in favor of tying it to an Israeli commitment to Palestinian statehood.

The other important question is, can America still rein Israel in, particularly if that is needed to preserve its own interests? There is some relevant historical precedent here. During the 1973 Arab Israeli war, Henry Kissinger was able to carefully manage the resupply of US military equipment and supplies to Israel to constrain their actions against Egypt. This pushed both sides towards a ceasefire, ultimately laying the foundations for the 1978 Camp David Accords and a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

A crucial element was Israeli material dependence on the US. Since October 2023, the US has enacted at least $16.3 billion in direct military aid to Israel across three separate pieces of legislation, including $6.7 specifically for missile defense. Thus, while Israel is still a beneficiary of American aid, the nature of this aid has gone from conditional to committed. Unlike in 1973 where Kissinger was able to constrain the Israelis by credibly threatening to cut off resupply, the current aid is now being given as part of decade-long Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that both Congress and the executive in practice have treated as a commitment to be honored regardless of any policy frictions.

This creates a moral hazard for the Israeli government where they can defy US requests on ceasefires or humanitarian access with little expectations of any financial consequences. Secondly, domestic Israeli arms production has partially reduced their dependence on imports. Moreover, much of the technological dependence is now mutual, with Israeli systems being embedded in American defense production. A key example is the F-35 program, where not only does Israel produce wings for the jets, but Israeli innovation in modifying the stealth aircraft can be of great use to other operators (including the US).

This is not to say that the US is without any leverage. The US has been acting as a diplomatic shield in international forums for Israel, including using its veto on UN Security Council resolutions. However, this episode suggests that Washington may be discovering, somewhat late, that it has far fewer tools to discipline an ally than it once did.

There is also the question of motivation: is the US inclined to restrain Israel? Trump has invested heavily in the alliance, and any move to constrain Israel would cost him politically at home. These costs are made worse by the fact that most sitting legislators, especially Republicans, remain aligned with Israel. In fact, any decision to constrain Israel on the part of Trump may carry more domestic costs for him than for Israel.

A pause on weapons transfers would create supply problems (especially for bunker-buster bombs used against hardened Iranian nuclear sites). However, Israel’s own defense industry would partly fill the gap. The more effective lever may in fact be diplomatic: a US decision to abstain rather than veto at the Security Council can impose reputational costs that are harder for Israel to absorb. The fact that Washington has not reached for either of these tools suggests the constraint is as much political will as material capacity.