Very interesting. Too bad about the book.
I like the argument and agree that having the airforce as an independent bureaucracy increases the likelihood that they will oversell the effectiveness of airpower, but would contend that this understates the extent to which politicians themselves have an incentive to over-rely on airpower, especially in an age of post-heroic warfare. Airpower enthusiasts are not the only ones that are easily distracted by cool toys and anti-Clausewitzian in the sense of tying to negate the fundamentally political character of war. Clausewitz is so important precisely because most strategic thinkers before AND after him have failed to grasp this. So, even if those assets were to be devolved to the other branches or if forces were re-arranged in any other way, strategists and politicians, motivated by domestic political considerations, wishful thinking and a misunderstanding of the nature of war would probably still rely too much on airpower and whatever new fad comes next (cyber, nano, robots?).