Over two decades have passed since the horrifying 9/11 attacks. Do we have a consensus understanding of the radicalization process in communities that supported or filled the ranks of jihadist groups, including the likes of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Hamas, and the Taliban?

The answer (see also here) is a resounding no! As more political science scholars conduct terrorism research than scholars from any other discipline, they have a vested interest in getting this phenomenon right and helping to frame policies that effectively address the threats.

In an interconnected world, violent social movements with a global scope are emerging, of which Islamist extremism is one. Let me start with a 2013 guest post by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walton The Duck of Minerva. They were critical of the lack of sufficient attention paid to theory development in the field of political science. Theories outline causal mechanisms that connect cause with effect. They note that, instead, the emphasis in political science research has been on “simplistic hypothesis testing,” where theory plays a minor role, with most of the effort devoted to collecting data and testing empirical propositions. But they did not explain how one might frame a theory in a social context.

Not only do theories provide a picture of reality, Nobelist Steven Weinberg argued the following in his book, Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist’s Search for the Ultimate Laws of Nature: the underlying “simplicity and rigidity” in a theoretical explanation of a phenomenon is “a means to the end of finding scientific explanations and judging their validity.” In the context of the social sciences, we may seek an explanation of a social phenomenon that is time-bound rather than being a timeless law of nature.     

Not surprisingly, the so-called simplistic hypothesis testing has come to dominate the attempts to find the causes of terrorism. Scholars have identified several (risk) factors as covariates associated with measures of violent extremism, including regime type, demographics, economic conditions, poverty and inequality, state capacity, domestic policy, political stability, foreign policy, and culture. However, such research does not test specific theories. In this context, we may define radicalism as embracing ideas that stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, and violent extremism constitutes the willingness of some radicalized individuals to use violence against civilians or civilian entities. Terrorism is a form of violent extremism.

To make the causation assertion, one must prove that these factors and measures are independent (cause) and dependent (effect) variables, respectively. What if a confounding influence affects all of the above variables? In that case, even the so-called independent variables are dependent variables of the confounder. We then have no causation here. Unfortunately, studies based on simplistic hypothesis testing cannot account for all confounding influences and thus cannot provide definitive causal explanations.

First, getting out of this logjam involves identifying a candidate causal mechanism pertinent to Islamist extremism. I recently observed in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism that such mechanisms are most effectively identified in communities where the phenomenon has recently emerged. Such a community can also help us understand potential confounding influences and circumstances that led to the phenomenon’s emergence. Still, a theoretical framework for incorporating a causal mechanism in the context of a social movement may be needed, which led me to propose a theme-enabler’s framework in Science, Religion and Culture. Here, enablers (independent variable) utilize an appealing theme to propagate agendas of their interest, including radical ones (dependent variables). Enablers must have a vested interest in promoting a theme and be well-placed to do so. The theme forms a causal mechanism, and these three variables provide a practical framework for understanding a violent social movement. 

Regarding Islamist extremism, that Sharia-emphasizing Wahhabism’s worldwide propagation led to radicalization across the planet is a testable assumption, especially if we could find a community that was largely secular and subsequently got exposed to Wahhabism. Data from such a community can serve as a treatment control (to tease out independent variables) for assessing the impact of Wahhabism’s propagation.

This is where the new Muslim-majority Eastern European nation of Kosovo comes in, having been formed from the remnants of the former Yugoslavia. Until 1999, Kosovo exhibited secular cohabitation and had no history of religious militancy. Yet, after the propagation of Wahhabism, it became a significant source of jihadists to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, thanks to local religious leaders’ propaganda. Yet none of the factors mentioned previously generated religious radicalization or militancy in Kosovo before the spread of Wahhabism. Thus, the factors — regime type, demographics, economic conditions, poverty and inequality, state capacity, domestic policy, political stability, foreign policy, and culture — are not causes; rather, they are dependent variables of the ecosystem generated by the propaganda of religious leaders.

In a Cogent Social Sciences article, I outlined a linear regression analysis of the three variables that substantiated the following theory or explanation of Islamist extremism: Backed by the prestige and resources of Saudi Arabia, religious leaders have popularized the appealing theme of Sharia as an all-encompassing “divine law” to advance radical agendas that act as precursors to [violent] extremism. The theme serves as a mediator between the independent (religious leaders) and dependent (radical agendas) variables. Here, the cause or causal mechanism associated with Islamist extremism is religious leaders using the Sharia platform (Sharia is a religious leader’s/scholar’s interpretation of Islam) to propagate radical agendas. The basis of the assertion of a causal inference comes from using a treatment control to understand the impact of Wahhabism’s propagation (noted above) and on the strengths of the coefficients of determination (R-squared) involving the three variables that define the causal chain outlined in my Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict article.

Through the above work (Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict), we understand the origins of Islamist radicalization and find a measure of radicalization risk in twenty lands using the 2013 Pew data. This work used the corporal punishment of cutting off the hands of thieves and robbers, advocated by religious leaders, as a radical agenda of interest and a measure of radicalization risk. This agenda is radical in the sense that very few countries have enacted it as law, and even those that have (such as Saudi Arabia) hardly enforce it. Yet an analysis of the Pew data for twenty lands shows that in fourteen of these lands, at least 20% of the public supports the punishment. In all of these fourteen lands, there had been homegrown jihadist attacks. Whereas in countries that did not experience jihadist attacks, they all had less than 20% public support for the punishment. Thus, overall, many Muslim communities — not just some — have been radicalized and have the potential for hosting jihadist groups.

Not only did a community’s support for Sharia correlate with its support for corporal punishment and religious leaders, but even within each community, those who favored Sharia were more supportive of the punishment. Thus, the data suggests that reducing the possibility of violent extremism involves reducing the radicalization risk. To minimize the radicalization risk, the identified causal explanation (see above) calls for the counternarrative that Sharia interpretations are mostly opinions of religious leaders/scholars.

While violence is one endpoint of Islamist radicalization, the others can include the socioeconomic stagnation of affected communities. Since the extent of radicalization correlates with public support for religious leaders (as noted before), these leaders could drive a community into socioeconomic stagnation.

For example, in Pakistan, where the public support for corporal punishment, religious leaders, and Sharia hover around 80%, Muslim religious leaders have discouraged modern education and encouraged large families. There has been a history of these religious leaders urging governments to prioritize religious education, often at the expense of modern education, which I discussed in an issue of the Albany Government Law Review. The support for the premise that Muslim religious leaders played a role in driving Pakistan into socioeconomic stagnation comes from a comparison of its multi-year GDP with that of Hindu-majority India — whose GDP growth has taken off, unlike Pakistan’s, even though these two neighboring nations share history, language, culture, and culinary habits.

Proving causation in the phenomenon of Islamist extremism is challenging due to the presence of multiple interacting variables and the difficulty in selectively controlling them. Nonetheless, one could not overstate the urgent imperative to understand causation in this phenomenon. New research shows how we can make significant advances toward finding a solution using quantitative methodologies.