President Donald Trump’s foreign policy sharply departs from the goals and methods of traditional US foreign policy. He has turned against traditional allies, shredded US foreign policy bureaucracies, and abandoned long-term US goals including the promotion of democracy, human rights, and economic development. I argue that Christian Reus-Smit’s (1999) book, The Moral Purpose of the State, can help explain these departures. This framing clarifies several extraordinary aspects of Trump’s foreign policy including hostility toward traditional democratic US allies and international organizations, the extensive use of tariffs, the destruction or politicization of the much of the US foreign policy bureaucracy, and the remarkable number of inexperienced and incompetent high-level staffers in his administration.

Reus-Smit argues that understanding the values different societies hold and how they conceive of the purpose of the state is necessary to grasp how states act in the international realm. These beliefs include who the state is supposed to serve and what outcomes should it try to bring about. These beliefs about the moral purpose of the state in turn shape both norms of state behavior and institutions. Reus-Smit further argues that contestation about ideals and the proper political order are just as much a feature of the international as domestic political realm. This means that the social identity of the state shapes systems of diplomacy and the goals of states—both to directly advance the state’s goals and to create a global normative environment where states with such views are legitimated and can thrive.

Specifically, Reus-Smit argues that when states share conceptions of the purpose state these conceptions become central in creating international structures— what he calls “fundamental institutions”—especially regarding norms of justice and sovereignty. Thus, states try to shape the world in their own image. This implies that states are more likely to work with others that share their fundamental beliefs and may work to bring about likeminded governments in states where these views are not currently held. Therefore, a foreign policy consistent with the MAGA world view would both help advance Trump’s goals directly, but also work to create a world where regimes like Trump’s were normalized and ideologically acceptable, thereby strengthening his regime at home. In other words, understanding the moral purpose of the state helps to explain foreign policy goals, methods, and alignment preferences.

The MAGA movement’s conception of the purpose of the state is that it should serve and advance the interests and dominion of American white Christian nationalism and traditional masculinity. For MAGA, Trump is a savior chosen to advance their cause. Trump, while sharing the traditional masculine and white nationalist perspectives of the broader MAGA movement, is not particularly religious, and sees the purpose of the state in narrower, patrimonial terms. He believes the state is his personal possession to do with as he wants to advance his own personal interests. That means the state exists to keep him in power and to enrich himself, his family, and his key supporters. His supporters’ tendency to see him as a uniquely chosen leader empowered to advance their world view gives him the freedom to personalize the MAGA purpose of the state and divert US foreign policy for his own ends even though this aligns only imperfectly with the broader MAGA vision. While the effects of these views and interests are starkest in the domestic sphere, they have also strongly shaped US foreign policy.

In particular, this conception of the state and its purposes goes a long way in explaining the administration’s hostility toward traditional US democratic allies. Such allies’ goals and institutions do very little to advance Trump’s or MAGA’s interests. Generally, they embrace the rule of law, which limits opportunities for personal gain by members of the administration, and favor equality and diversity. Additionally, by embodying and championing democracy and the rule of law, they present an alternative and implicit challenge to the Trump regime and its self-entrenchment. This is especially true of democracies like Brazil and South Korea that have recently defeated attempted presidential self-coups as they demonstrate not only that the agenda of someone like Trump can be defeated, but that those who attempt to overthrow a democracy should and can be held accountable before the law. Hence, the preference for right-wing authoritarian governments like those in Hungary and Russia, the willingness of high ranking administration officials to meet with out-of-power white nationalist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and the Party for Freedom, and the call to bring parties that favor Trump’s policies into power in Europe. 

This framing also helps explain Trump’s focus on tariffs. There are good reasons to believe Trump truly favors autarkic economic arrangements and tariffs are consistent with a crude attempt to promote increased US manufacturing which is perceived by MAGA as masculine. (White nationalism, however, cannot explain tariffs as tariffs on Canadaand the EU would be puzzling given that framework). In addition to these ideological reasons to support protectionism, tariffs provide significant opportunities for graft. Much as with new regulations and changes to economic subsidies in the domestic economy, tariffs also allow Trump to pick winners and losers. This can be done to reward supporters and punish opponents in the service of regime consolidation or for the more venal motive of personal enrichment. Given that the president and his chief officials have the power to create carve outs for countries and companies, the temptation to take bribes or obtain economic concessions for favored businesses is immense. 

Furthermore, Trump’s and MAGA’s view of the purpose of the state helps to explain the destruction of USAID and the cancelling of so much foreign aid. An agency designed to help the poor and promote international human and economic development serves no function given the MAGA worldview. Trump has argued aid makes the United States appear weak—the antithesis of MAGA’s focus on cultivating an image of masculine strength. Conversely, an ideologically conservative, even authoritarian state, might well find a development agency of use to spread its ideology and as a source of national influence. Certainly, China and Saudi Arabia use development funds to advance those sorts of interests. But the MAGA state does not have those sorts of interests and so USAID was simply a bureaucratic obstacle to be destroyed. Further, given that USAID focused on helping the poor and destitute, it would not have been an effective vehicle for extracting foreign bribes.

Similarly, this is why Trump’s foreign policy seeks to undermine international organizations—even those that were founded by the United States, in which the United States has significant, entrenched institutional power, and that have for years advanced American interests. This is because they are structured to advance the older conception of American interests and reflect an older conception of America. As Reus-Smit argues, changes in the moral purpose of the state lead to changes in the international system and its institutions. Hence, these international organizations are, like USAID, more hindrance than help given the MAGA conception of the state.

Likewise, the politicization of the US military—especially at the highest levels—advances regime entrenchment and serves white nationalist interests. Trump wants a military that will protect him and target his opponents far more than he wants a highly effective fighting force. Similarly, the purge of women and minorities from positions of leadership, while harming morale and effectiveness, serves the masculine and white nationalist conception of the state. Authoritarians also often actively deploy military forces at home rather than having them prepare for missions abroad, thus trading off military readiness for regime security. Trump’s recent use of the National Guard fits this pattern. Such military politicization is typical of authoritarian regimes and is an unsurprising, if a stark and deeply worrying, departure from US tradition. The buildup of an armed security force independent of the military chain of command, such as ICE, is also a standard authoritarian tactic. In short, Trump’s remaking of the military’s leadership and role fits closely with his and his supporters’ conception of the state.

More surprising perhaps is heavy reliance on personal diplomacy, such as the recent Alaska summit with Putin, and the extensive use of inexperienced special envoys, such as Steve Witkoff. Yet, this makes perfect sense given the focus on extracting economic concessions for Trump and his close associates. Professional bureaucrats would focus their efforts on advancing broader US interests, not the personal interests of the president, his family, and friends. They simply would not conceive of their job in such a manner, so it logically follows that they get cut out. Indeed, without personal control of diplomacy, it becomes exceedingly challenging to use tools such as tariffs for personal enrichment. This explains why so many of the high level political appointees in the Defense Department, intelligence community, and diplomatic corps are inexperienced and incompetent. Serious, experienced US foreign policy hands—even ideologically very conservative ones—do not see the goals of US foreign policy as advancing the personal interests of Trump and his associates. They believe in advancing broader US national interests. While these are always subjective, they are conceived of as public rather than private goods. This is also why neo-conservatives and former national security officials were some of the earliest and remain some of the loudest and steadfast anti-Trump voices on the Right. It also explains why even a staunch conservative like John Bolton ultimately became a targeted enemy of Trump. Last, the focus on masculinity and whiteness has resulted in political appointees and a military leadership that largely comes from only a portion of the population, excluding potentially talented people from service. Thus, the combination of MAGA ideology and Trump’s patrimonialist view of the state directly reduce the quality of US foreign policy personnel.

None of this is to “sane-wash” or justify Trump’s foreign policy. The bumbling and incompetence is real as are the effects of Trump’s inattention and laziness. Frankly, much of it is baked into the cake as competent, experienced foreign policy professionals will be extremely unlikely to want to serve to advance MAGA goals that are antithetical to more traditional views of the purpose of the American states. Crucially, many of the policies that serve the new purpose of the state are directly opposed to policies that served older conceptions of the purpose of the American state. Rather, this analytical approach serves to explain many of the foreign policy goals and organizational decisions of the Trump administration, not defend or justify them.

Nor does it mean that Trump’s foreign policy will be a success even on its own terms. Other states do not share the MAGA conception of the purpose of the state and will resist Trump’s attempts to remake the international order. Crafting a new order with likeminded states will be difficult, since while there are ample authoritarian states in the world, there are only a few states, such as Russia and Hungary, that explicitly espouse a white, Christian, masculine order. Plus, there are considerable divisions and animosities within the authoritarian camp. Instead, while others may share Trump’s desire to tear down the old order, they would likely seek to impose their own preferences on whatever replaces it. Last, Americans may ultimately reject the MAGA view of the state and the foreign policy implications inherent in that view. Nevertheless, understanding that the MAGA movement’s and Trump’s view of the purpose of the state helps explain and contextualize Trump’s foreign policy and why it departs so sharply from the foreign policies of past US presidents, both Republican and Democratic.