The UN General Assembly meeting has seen a growing number of states recognizing a state of Palestine, including Western powers like France, the United Kingdom and Canada. Debate has swirled over why they are doing this: is it a principled stand, an attempt to gain international or domestic clout, etc.? But there’s a bigger question over whether this matters and when it may matter: that is, at what point does the informal recognition of an entity as a state lead to actual changes in international relations?

A few scenarios are possible. Maybe there is a tipping point, where enough countries accept it that it de facto becomes a state. Maybe it requires great power acceptance, which hinges on the United States. Maybe there is a normative basis where a state is deemed legitimate (and, by extension, illegitimate).

This is a bigger question than can be answered in a blog post, but I did a quick survey of IR scholarship to see what others have said on this issue (and I’ll be happy to update this post if people send me works I didn’t include). Figuring this out matters: for those who want to see a Palestinian state, they need to pay attention to the process through which this will occur, as simply declaring it so won’t help, and may actually make things worse for Palestinians. For those who argue a Palestinian state is not legitimate, they need to explain why.

The current legal status of a Palestinian state

Before looking at the scholarship, where do things stand on a Palestinian state?

While the United Kingdom promised a Jewish state in the then-Mandate of Palestine through the Balfour Declaration, it also recognized the need to provide a political home for Palestine’s Arab population by the 1930s. The 1937 Peel Commission report called for partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas, but this plan was rejected by the Arab Higher Committee. The UK tried again about a decade later, handing it over to the United Nations. The UN voted to similarly partition Palestine, with Jerusalem as an independent zone. That plan fell apart with the outbreak of civil war in Palestine, Israel’s declaration of independence, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. That war ended with an independent Israel, and Palestinian territories divided between Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

That’s where things remained for decades, until the PLO declared a Palestinian state in 1988 made up of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem. This progressed into the Oslo Process, in which Israel recognized a Palestinian Authority (PA) over these areas–with plans for future negotiations–and the PA recognized Israel’s existence. As we know, this process stalled, despite various attempts to move ahead with a two-state solution.

International recognition of Palestine, however, continued. 3/4 of UN member states recognize a state of Palestine, and Palestine has non-member observer status in the UN General Assembly; it is also a member of UNESCO and the ICC. Support for Palestinian recognition extends to the US public, with a little over half saying the US should recognize Palestine as a state in an August 2025 poll. But the United States has vetoed official recognition of Palestine’s membership application in the Security Council. The United States has said their veto is based on a desire for statehood to arise from negotiation, rather than imposition by the international community.

Momentum towards international recognition–prompted by anger over Israel’s war against Hamas and the devastating humanitarian toll it has enacted on the Palestinians in Gaza–continues, however.

The question remains, however: does this matter? It likely matters as a show of solidarity to Palestinians; I haven’t seen data on how Palestinians are responding, as most focuses on international opinions. Hussein Ibish has argued it will have positive effects for Palestinians and Israel, by delegitimizing Hamas and making it easier for the PA to function as a governing authority. Others, however, have argued that this will make things worse, as the PA would be unable to function and has not indicated it will compromise with Israel.

Whichever side you find more convincing, however, it all remains prospective without better data.

When does international recognition work?

Alright, let me take a step back into academic scholarship.

Much work on international recognition understandable comes from international legal studies. Early studies focused on the complex legal matters that involve recognizing a government, especially in the pre-UN era. Later works explored the UN criteria, that a potential state must be able to function as a state, be peace-loving, and accept international legal obligations. The ability to function as a state is based on the 1933 Montevideo convention, of having a permanent population, defined territory and government, and ability to enter into relations with other states; another way to put this is the ability to be effective as a state. A study on post-Cold War UK state recognition practice noted a shift from merely accepting new states that joined the UN to imposing normative conditions on statehood. Another noted the particular question of indigenous rights, which are recognized along states.

There have been some empirical studies. One noted a consistency in UN recognition of states in the 1970s and 1980s, which indicated an international norm behind statehood. A systematic study argued that the deciding factor is the support of great powers. Others noted differing degrees of recognition. A few studies have noted the tensions that emerged over the partial recognition of Kosovo. One study on Kosovo and South Ossetia noted the decline of international law’s influence to the benefit of realpolitik. An analysis of South Sudan’s independence found a combination of diplomacy with neighbors and UN support mattering. And a study specifically on the recognition of Palestine found international recognition increased support for partition and decreases support for compromise.

Will recognition of Palestine have an impact?

What does this scholarship suggest about the impact of increasing recognition of a state of Palestine? I’d suggest it doesn’t provide much support for those excited for unilateral recognitions. The prerequisites for statehood are missing for Palestine. One can point to Israel as the cause of this–its limitations on the PA and settlement of what would have been Palestinian land–but that doesn’t change the situation. Moreover, the experience of Kosovo suggests that the contentious recognition of a new state may exacerbate international tensions.

Contentious questions of international recognition have involved breakaway provinces declaring independence or the UN refusing to recognize newly established entities, as occurred with apartheid-era South Africa. I don’t know that there’s been a case like Israel and a potential Palestine. Moreover, the demands on Israel seem to range from recognition of a Palestinian state in line with the Oslo Process focus on the Gaza Strip and West Bank, or some more radical change to the nature of Israel as a distinct state. Even if the recognition focuses on the Gaza Strip and West Bank, with East Jerusalem as a capital, this would be a more dramatic change in the status quo than other new state recognitions.

The logic behind the current push for recognition seems to be that it will isolate the United States and Israel to the point that the former abandons its veto of recognition. Given the Trump Administration’s reactions to these moves, however, that is unlikely. But it is worth noting that the Trump Administration seems to support a two-state solution in theory. Trump recently told Arab leaders that he would oppose any Israeli annexation of the West Bank, and this reportedly came from regional leaders arguing such a move would destroy the Abraham Accords, of which Trump is very proud.

Based on the studies I reviewed, there isn’t much evidence that the wave of recognition for Palestine in the UN will lead to de facto statehood. But as I said this is an unprecedented situation. Maybe the recognition will produce a normative consensus, and we are seeing the “cascade” part of normative change. But nothing will happen while the United States is opposed. Diplomatic engagement may be more effective than isolation or shaming. Likewise, defenders of Palestinians may want to look for more opportunities to work with sympathetic forces in Israel, as I’ve argued, rather than cutting them off.

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