Courtesy of our friends at The Economist:
PhD graduates do at least earn more than those with a bachelor’s degree. A study in the Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management by Bernard Casey shows that British men with a bachelor’s degree earn 14% more than those who could have gone to university but chose not to. The earnings premium for a PhD is 26%. But the premium for a master’s degree, which can be accomplished in as little as one year, is almost as high, at 23%. In some subjects the premium for a PhD vanishes entirely. PhDs in maths and computing, social sciences and languages earn no more than those with master’s degrees. The premium for a PhD is actually smaller than for a master’s degree in engineering and technology, architecture and education. Only in medicine, other sciences, and business and financial studies is it high enough to be worthwhile. Over all subjects, a PhD commands only a 3% premium over a master’s degree.
Well, duh. Getting a Ph.D. is not, and should not be thought of as, a rational economic decision. It’s a vocation, something you do because you can’t not do it. Lots of people who get Ph.D.s should not, and lots of institutions over-produce Ph.D.s because they have lost the plot, and come to regard Ph.D. students as indentured servants who can teach the undergraduate students; in that way the article’s analysis is spot-on. But the implied solution — that we ought to re-think the Ph.D. in terms of the non-academic job-market skills that it can equip one with — is, I would say, silly and absurd. “Academics tend to regard asking whether a PhD is worthwhile as analogous to wondering whether there is too much art or culture in the world,” the article somewhat sarcastically claims, committing the basic fallacy that The Economist (and: economists) always commit and reducing the social to a mass of individuals; the proper parallel to art and culture is not the Ph.D., but theoretical knowledge. Do we really want to live in a world without anything but lifestyles selected by the almighty market?
The point is driven home with the observation that “doing a PhD may still be a bad choice for an individual.” “Bad” how? In terms of financial return? Yes, granted. Don’t do this unless you have to, your road is a lot easier and more lucrative if you don’t. But some of us have to, since we’re fond of preserving our souls intact, and that’s not a rational decision. Does the academic system need work? Yes, it does. Ph.D. training has to emphasize teaching more, and colleges and universities generally have to stop talking so much about the increased earning potential of their graduates as if that was why one went to college (that might be a motive, but it’s not the reason — not a philosophically defensible one, anyway, and now we cue Socrates to say his bit about “the unexamined life”). And academics need to get away from the misleading delusion that it’s their research that matters and not their teaching; theoretically-informed scholarship spurs thinking, nothing more and nothing less, even if various mundane spin-offs sometimes arise from such scholarship more or less by accident. Neal Stephenson, as usual, gets this right.
The bottom line: don’t go down this road unless you can’t not do it. The double negative here is deliberate, since the value of the academic vocation is a negative one: it’s a refuge, a fallout shelter, what Nietzsche probably would have called the cocoon within which the philosophical spirit can survive, since we now live in a world where the figure of the priest doesn’t play that role in the same way as it once did. Come shelter with us if you need to; I at least will endeavor to keep the light on and the door unbarred as long as possible. Economic rationality be damned.
This Economist piece is a great example of the confusion between “raionality” and “maximizing money for myself”. Rationality as a technical criterion is completely agnostic to the content of preferences – my desire to have a PhD or to teach Sociology can be stronger than my desire to make more than 50k/year, and that's perfectly rational in a technical sense. But that definition is also basically useless, and so economists (and many others) routinely substitute that assumption with one of maximizing money for myself, which of course no one does. Crooked Timber's John Quiggin had a great quote on the subject:
“First, most rational actor models assume that “rationality” can be represented as “maximization of self-interest”. This assumption is either false or vacuous. Those committed to egoistic rationality tend, when challenged, to oscillate between the two definitions, in much the manner of the function sin (1/x) as x approaches zero.”
So, more directly connected to the post: don't give up on rationality for the PhD-seeker! Yeah, it may not be in my narrowly conceived economic self-interest to pursue one, but if we look at “compensating differentials” (lifestyle, prestige, not having to sell my soul, etc.) it can be perfectly rational. The question is what kind of substantive assumptions we are making about the preferences of PhD-seekers, and what kind of information they have. Let's not let the Economist (and economics) claim rationality for the almighty dollar so easily!
PTJ: I agree with a good deal of this post (I haven't read The Economist piece, but it sounds predictably bad).
However, your notion (expressed on more than one occasion) of academics as a new sort of priestly caste, set apart to seek out theoretical knowledge for its own sake and out of love for their vocations, dedicated to nurturing “the philosophical spirit” in its sheltering cocoon, has the effect, it seems to me, of stroking the egos (to put it crudely) of those who have made this vocational choice successfully (i.e. those who have academic jobs) and of making everyone else (including underemployed and unemployed PhDs) feel inferior, though I'm sure this is not your intention. Or perhaps not inferior but duped, as in: ah ha, you got a PhD although you shouldn't have b/c you didn't have the requisite quasi-priestly vocation and the requisite all-consuming passion, and now look where you are! Serves you right for doing something you shouldn't have done! It's like Calvinist election: if one has an academic job, that's an earthly sign of salvation and an indication that one had the vocation all along; if one doesn't have an academic job (despite having a PhD), that's a sign that one's calling was somehow insufficient. Again, I'm sure this isn't your intended message, but that is how the this-is-a-priestly-vocation-don't-do-it-unless-you-can't-not-do-it line speaks to me. Perhaps this is just my idiosyncratic reaction, not shared by anyone else; I don't know.
So, I think when discussing the academy, rather than consistently laying out diametrically opposed positions (which there are some positions that truly are incommensurable, I concede that), I question if the greater debate is: how can the academy promote learning, teaching, and research in an environment that involves a radically quick conception of being and time? We know it can no longer strive to be an anachronism, the institution is crumbling internally due to external forces. Neither is it sufficient to think of it as a shelter; after all, the soldiers will eventually make their way in or those restricted inside may succumb to madness. It has to evolve, but in what direction? At the end of the day, I don't regret reading Foucault obviously or any work in philosophy and social theory (well, maybe a few, but that's another story). I do, however, recognize that the institution itself will not judge me though for that knowledge, but will judge me by the dissertation I produce, or the courses I take. I will be judged unfortunately, by what's on my transcript, what makes I have, and how I can articulate in statements how my “interests” fit that of the establishment. The quantification of value and being is already there unfortunately. The academy itself is in many respects consequentialist given that it's influenced by our culture like any other social institution. So, communities have to make crucial choices regarding the precious resources we have, and find creative spaces (and be creative with time too) to preserve what's important. I still think it remains an open question, how can the academy conceptualize its own sense of being and time, and also respond in turn?
Oh, and since we're discussing education, I found this clip by Sir Ken Robinson to be a classic. He asks, “Do Schools Kill Creativity?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iG9CE55wbtY
I think this is a slightly better piece than you suggest. It would be good to think that students only undertake PhDs if they are conscious of a vocation, but I suspect most of them also hope for an academic job when they are done, and one of the strong points the author is making is that many of them will be disappointed. Instead they will find themselves being exploited while they are writing the doctorate, and often unemployed and 'overqualified' after they have finished. You and I as tenured professors can tell them that education is its own reward, but I suspect that isn't much of a consolation if you find yourself in that situation. If good capable students understand what the deal is and are prepared to take the risk, that's fine, but I suspect a lot of students do indeed drift into doctorates without fully grasping the implications, and that's a shame.
I agree with Chris–my general take on this can be found in this post and my comments to it.
Patrick may be right that you shouldn't pursue a PhD and a career in academia unless you “can't not do it”, but this ignores the reality of failing to find a tenure track job that will provide financial security and that it's almost impossible for someone to understand what they are getting themselves into until they are actually in it.
Why is becoming an academic any different than pursuing a career in sports or Hollywood? Let's not get carried away with our own importance — there are many fields in which success is exceedingly difficult (as measured by the ability to live off the earnings) yet people try all the time. It's been pointed out that families often spend an enormous amount of money on their children's youth sports (teams, individual coaches, travel, etc.) often with the hopes of earning a college scholarship. However, the possibility of actually getting a college scholarship is very low, and basically not worth the money even if they earn one. Moving to Hollywood and trying to become an actor, spending a decade rolling around the minor leagues in baseball…all are similar to the academic career in terms of the low probability of success. What is different about academia?
The fact that the education of subsequent generations depends upon it, hence it's not overblown to be concerned (as compared with other career paths). If competition is the root of it, I question if either A) standards for tenure need to change, or B) dropped altogether in favor of offering “full-time employment,” but as with other institutions, the possibility of getting fired remains on the table. That way, the stakes wouldn't be so great for granting tenure in the first place (of course, it was designed to protect academic freedom, but I'd say it's currently being used to weed out those who don't meet the preferences of the establishment through publishing anyhow). The other main issue, and here's where economists could provide fruitful analysis: is it possible to open up more permanent positions, and if so, what would be necessary economically to do this? I suppose I'm baffled given how high tuition fees are, the endowments available, etc. that universities still find themselves cutting costs. It begs the question if a severe degree of financial mismanagement is happening I think. Or, perhaps cut down the pay for tenured staff a bit so that more positions can be opened up for junior faculty, which could make the institution as a whole more tenable. If I'm not mistaken, at certain institutions, tenured faculty or senior academics make up to 100,000 or more (with huge caveats out there). So there's a huge discrepancy between what senior academics and staff make and their junior non-tenured counterparts; perhaps lessen the income gap (despite tentative protests here) to decrease the number of adjuncts in favor of more full-time positions? To me, it's that same odd situation one sees when corporate executives' bonuses remain in-tact while the lower desk folks get laid off first.
There are more and less pragmatic ways of pursuing a PhD. Over the last several years, the opportunity cost has not been real high due to the rampant unemployment. The longer you spend on it, the higher the opportunity cost, so avoiding sub-disciplines and topics that don't take the the most 'economical' path is ill advised. Specializing in a language and getting grants for field research is probably the best way to avoid debt while chasing this dream.
While I agree that the motivation for entering academia is not primarily based on accruing wealth, I don't think that political science is much of a 'refuge for the philosophical spirit'. Anthropology comes closer to that 'ideal type' of a discipline that sacrifices $ for philosophical development. Getting a PhD in Philosophy is even more ludicrous, the odds are approaching lottery proportions.
I am jaded on the argument that the production of theoretical knowledge is the reason for the existence of this vocation. I would argue that the transfer of knowledge comes before knowledge production. I have strategized based on the topics and venue in which I want to teach rather than contributing to the discipline.
Techne: “I don't think that political science is much of a 'refuge for the philosophical spirit'….”
Well, I know what you're saying here, but partly that depends on the kind of work one does (wants to do/manages to do) and on how closely it hews, or doesn't, to dominant notions/styles of political science. After all, there are some philosophically inclined political scientists (including the original post's author).
What I am trying to say here, is that if an undergraduate came to me and said that they wanted to study philosophy and apply that study to the world, I would be reluctant to send them to political science for graduate study. First, because what they would end up studying would be completely different from what most undergraduates have in mind when they think of philosophy. Second, the philosophical element of political science is pretty marginalized within the discipline.
Dan: yes indeed, and precisely why I keep saying “economic rationality” in the post. Rationality as a technical criterion is probably uncontestable, as long as one has a sufficiently broad substantive definition of goals; the dastardly assumption in The Economist piece (and as you note, among economists broadly speaking, since models get soluble when preferences are revealed in the easily commensurable terms of monetary value) is that all goals are about maximizing income.
Vocation is not successful employment, however. Lots of people are employed in academia who don't have the proper vocation, and lots of people without the proper vocation aren't employed. The two things have little to do with one another, because the world is not set up in a way that justice always triumphs in the end, unfortunately. My only point is that the unlikelihood of anything approaching worldly success at the end of the Ph.D. road really means that only those who can't not do it ought to set out on the path to begin with. For such people, weighing their chances is, I think, counterproductive. And hopefully everyone else will be frightened away by the slim chances of getting a plum job, making room for the rest of us.
The notion that the purity of one's vocation explains one's success may be vulgar Calvin — indeed, that's what Weber argued in PE, right? — but Weber, at least, had no illusions about the gap between vocation and success. Those of us with tenured jobs are lucky, and we owe it to everyone else to keep space open for others like us. I worry that we place entirely too much emphasis in hiring on silly things like a publication record, and far too little on things like “is this person actually intellectually curious?” And we don't list our positions with an eye to those latter things.
This may be a losing battle but that's no reason not to fight it.
I think that one of the defining characteristics of the academy is its untimeliness, which in an age of quickness comes across as being slow and deliberate. It's our job to hold spaces open and to draw a line to say “here the day-to-day largely stops, here the larger questions take over.” Sometimes that means protesting in the streets to stop the marketizing of higher education; sometimes it involves ranting on a blog; sometimes it involves lobbying the ministry of education, etc. But it always involves maintaining and tending the gardens of our own sanctuaries.
The time of political communities is not the time of the academy. That, I would argue, is the fundamental mistake made by people who want to university to be “relevant.” Universities and academics are not relevant, not in the short-term, and at least not as academics or academic institutions. Their — our — relevance unfolds over the longer term, as we refine the products of human innovation into lasting pieces of cultural equipment and pass them down to the next generation. We have to be a rock in the river, as I've said before, in order to do this well.
I would say that a lot of the problem comes from people and institutions misunderstanding what a PhD is for! There should be fewer people getting PhDs, definitely, but not because of the economic issues — because of the fact that only people with an academic vocation ought to be putting themselvs through this in the first place ;-) I'm all for people knowing what they're getting into before starting down this path, and that includes the diminished chances of a good job at the end. Down with drifting into a PhD, for sure.
And I would never say that education was its own reward; I would rather say that for some people a PhD is less a choice than a virtual necessity. It's those people we ought to be training and hiring.
I think that a certain amount of “ignoring reality” is a prerequisite for being an academic ;-) That said, I am all in favor of full disclosure for prospective PhDs — as fully as we can disclose to someone who hasn't really gotten themselves far enough in to completely grasp it. (It's like getting married or having kids — you think you know what you've gotten yourself into, and then you realize that you don't know, because the you that thought she or he knew is now a different person …) And, of course, for trying as much as possible to hire people with an academic vocation instead of just a stuffed-to-the-brim publication record.
Yes, but that's Political Science's problem and Political Science's loss. I advise my students to go into the global field of International Relations instead of the American discipline of Political Science if they have this kind of vocation. Political Science may be a lost cause — but again, that doesn't make the cause not worth fighting for when possible. But I want to be honest with my students, and make sure that they understand that there are few opportunities in Political Science to do what they want to do, and it's better out there in the rest of the world, in IR globally speaking.
I'm inclined to agree with you. I suppose where I'm coming from though concerns the question: which historical and social conditions enable certain types of knowledge to emerge and be sustained in the first place? That's where I question if the conflict occurs over the fact that the academy rests at the locus of tension between an aspiration for intellectual progress and the pressures of evolving conceptions of time, space, and being. It's questionable if prior achievements and “progress,” were produced in radically different circumstances that arguably are either not present, or have fundamentally changed, and have thus made intellectual achievement broadly defined much more difficult. Or, on the flip side, I question which conditions would enable the academy to maintain its sense of “untimeliness” as you mention given that this isn't a natural or essential mode of existence?
That's where in a sense, I'm surprised and not surprised by your remarks, because as a theorist, you obviously de-naturalize social processes. And yet, the academy called for in your post seems to be suspended in space, operate according to its own internal independent logic, and is divorced from external influences. Even if one could characterize it as a normative call (in the sense of what the academy “ought” to be doing), I question then if this normative account would be strengthened through a more contextualist approach. Or, in essence, even I question if normative theory can be divorced from extant social realities or the conditions of the possible. An example that comes to mind are critiques of Habermas' “ideal speech” situations, which as an intellectual exercise is great, but it's debatable whether those conditions will ever be approximated (and of course, there's debates if that misses the point of Habermas' theory, but I digress). Then again, in the debates between Foucault's supporters and Habermas', I know whose side I'd likely take :)
I suppose that, even though the contextual questions that you pose are fascinating ones (and, I would say, academic questions — the kind of question that can best be addressed in the untimely space of the academy), they are logically separate from the normative question of what the academy and academics ought to be. The desirability of a certain kind of academy, I think, is not really related to its achiveability; normative visions function as a kind of abstract standard that can be used to evaluate actually existing institutions, and perhaps as part of the conceptual equipment that one might social-scientifically use to analyze and explain things.
So the next question, I suppose, is: why is is a compelling vision? I think it's inherent in the very idea of scientific knowledge, but that's material for a later and longer post ;-)
And a related question: why aren't administrators doing more to maintain the walls, conceptual and physical, that keep the academy intact? Methinks that the CEO model has affected more than the pay scale.
Certainly it's a bad investment to spend so much on your kid's athletic competitions or drama productions in the probably vain hope of getting a college scholarship. But to spend so much in order to see whether your kid has the kind of vocation that will propel them into that line of work even if they don't succeed, since the prevailing system in both of those professions pretends to be about discriminating between the talented and the talent-less but everyone knows that talent doesn't gaurantee success in either line of work … I have no problem with that kind of investment. Let the employment issues take care of themselves later on; it's better to have a vocation and work to fulfill it.
As one of my students once told me: “I want to be a successful writer, but I'd rather be an unsuccessful writer than a great dentist.” (Paraphrasing somewhat here.) That's vocation, presuming that the sentiment is something other than an idle expression and is more of a summation of a set of experiences — something learned about oneself, something constitutive that sets one off in an unavoidable direction. Undergrad ought to be about helping people find that; a PhD is for those who discover that it's the academic life or nothing. No matter the cost.
Thanks, I think that is a helpful clarification. (And re 'vulgar Calvin', yes that is pretty much what Weber argued in PE, if I recall correctly. Point taken re Weber's own attitude.)
What if going through a PhD program helps one figure out what vocation they want to pursue? Surprisingly, Patrick, your view on this assumes quite a bit of rationality on the part of the decision maker at the begining of the “game”. It reminded me of Wendt's IO piece “Driving with the Rearview Mirror” to some degree. There's a lot of “should” in your analysis, but “should” and “can” are two different things.
What if someone hasn't discovered their true vocational calling prior to entering a PhD program? They have some sense that they'd like to pursue a career in academia, but can't know for sure until they immerse themselves. By your logic, unless they are sure they shouldn't begin the program. But if that was the case I am willing to bet many, many people that turn out to have that burning vocational desire would never pursue it–they would select themselves out since they aren't sure they must do it.
Also, pursuing a PhD may crystalize for others that while academia isn't their vocation, something related is (consulting, analysis, policy making, etc). We reason relatively and the preview of academia can help people realize that it may actually be some other vocation that will provide them with that emotional satisfaction.
I think Bill raises some great points here. I think there's a great difference between an advisor highlighting the benefits or downsides of entering a profession realistically, versus simply imposing their views of what education for that profession should be on their students. To me, it also presumes a great deal of “rationality” on the part of the advisor to basically ascertain who has “the vocation” for the profession or not. I honestly don't think any single advisor should occupy that position, because it can easily constitute an abuse of authority and power over prospective PhD students, or even the current undergrads they advise. The reason is that there are many great thinkers out there who other intellectuals thought shouldn't become scientists or artists, and eventually, those thinkers proved the establishment wrong, and were some of the most brilliant intellectuals of our time. I'm hesitant to grant any single individual that much power and authority over others.
It begs the great philosophical question: is a “vocation” something that is rationally ascertainable in the first place? Who is in the position to rationally judge and determine this? A vocation as we know, is a social construct, one ridden with political and power relationships and is certainly not value-neutral. At the end of the day, students should be left to decide how they wish to use their education; their advisors shouldn't be imposing their views regarding what an “appropriate” use is. If that person wants to become an academic, fantastic, if not, it's their choice and they have every right to use their PhD for other purposes.
This, I stress, is different than holding academics who have decided to choose that career-path to professional standards. In that sense, yes, fellow academics have the right to collectively decide who is fulfilling their vocational commitments or not. I think what's the best role for an advisor to take is the following: basically outline what one can do (not should do) with a PhD, and the fact that it is designed mainly for intellectuals, hence it's difficult to use it elsewhere, but not impossible, just extremely difficult. Also outline what is taught/expected in the PhD, and the fact that if a person really isn't that passionate about it, they will likely be miserable. Then, let the student decide if that's the path for them. For example, quite a few people who attend law school don't become lawyers. Bill's right here: quite a few decide in the course of their studies they wish to use a law degree for something else. I'd wager it's similar for PhDs. I think it would be terrible if faculty told students they should only attend law school if they plan to be a lawyer since that's an “appropriate use of education for their vocation.” Instead, the better advisors tell them, well, if you don't want to study X and Y subjects, and don't broadly speaking, plan to use your legal education in A, B, and C manners, you will probably be miserable. The difference here is that a PhD is obviously less versatile than a law degree, but I still think it's equally terrible if an advisor tells them, “Unless you plan to become an academic, don't do it.” That's an imposition of value standards I think, which emanates from an unreflective and unconscious notion of what a “vocation” is, in relation to alternative views of it.
I don't think that anyone gets to determine anyone else's vocation; that's something that one does, ultimately, by and for oneself, since the very determination of a vocation is constitutive of the person as such. My only concern is that people think very hard about that before they enter a training track that is intended to produce a particular kind of person. The fact that people sometimes find their vocations by leaving a program of study is interesting, and certainly happens, but I don't think that affects my overall claim that one should be pretty sure before entering the program in the first place — even if that surety changes over time. (I always tell people that going to law school if you don't want to be a lawyer is a waste of time, unless the career that you do want requires a law degree even though that career isn't “lawyer” — grad school is by definition narrower than undergrad, and people ought to have done the major finding of themselves before they commit to an intensive course of narrowly professional training. Plus you don't get many electives in grad school, so not a lot of opportunities to explore other areas.)
The issue is not rationally knowing, I don't think, but practically-morally knowing (if I may be permitted to toss in a distinction without completely spelling it out; I'll refer people to John Shotter's _Cultural Politics of Everyday Life_ for an elaboration, and promise to spell out the distinction in greater detail myself at some later point). Since a vocation isn't a fact, one can't know it like one knows what the capital of Assyria is, or like one knows how to set up a wireless home computer network. Rather, knowing a vocation is being in that vocation, and actively crafting oneself in a particular way. If I were Heidegger I'd prefer to say that one “dwells” in a vocation. One might be wrong only in the sense that one's sense of one's vocation changes, not that one initially acted on imperfect information and then rationally updated one's strategic preferences in a Bayesian way. So the trick of good undergraduate teaching is to enable students to find their vocations, and the trick of good graduate teaching is to enable students to develop their vocations.
In other words, there can be no science of vocations, and no foolproof method for ascertaining vocation one has; it's the asking of the question that is the really important thing. The major problem with the technology of economic decision-making, I think, is that it doesn't really let one ask the vocational question, preferring to translate that into things like “job satisfaction” or “reasonable financial compensation.” Those are worldly logics. Vocations are otherworldly, even if they have worldly consequences — and that goes for every vocation, even those that are politically activist.
I would say — all too briefly! — that Kant was wrong that the only alternative to empiricism was universalism. That's what ideal-typification is designed to solve in the scientific sphere: general claims wihout generalization. The moral equivalent, I think, has something to do with the care of the self, but that's something I will work on fleshing out in a subsequent post.
It's funny to see this kind of economic reductionism still making the rounds. I thought even the economists were on to the “three types of happiness” model – recognizing that people seek not only pleasure (financial reward), but also engagement and larger meaning in their efforts to create a happy life for themselves.
I think I probably could have not done it, in retrospect. There were other potential career paths which I think also could have been fulfilling for me. I could have worked in an international organization. I could have worked for the ACLU. (OK, apparently none of my potential career options were going to leave me with a Beemer in the garage.) However, I do love academia very much and even though I don't make much cash, I feel very rich in terms of my engagement and the degree to which I believe what I do is fundamentally meaningful.
I think, though, that this points to a failing of the field as a whole, and should be read not as advice to students, but as an admonishment to faculty and administrators who serve as gatekeepers in the hiring, promotion, and admission processes. As I have argued before here, I both agree with Patrick writ large but also with Bill–the PhD is a poor life choice for most for a number of reasons. The main one, though, is that the field is structured for you to fail: there are too many graduates and not enough jobs, and most jobs aren't anywhere the vocational ideal that motivate you to get your PhD. But, this is only partially a warning to the perspective student. Its a much larger warning to the field as a whole–“we” are creating new PhD programs at the same time as “we” are not hiring, not creating new tenure lines, and not developing an academically meaningful existence outside the University to take up the slack.*
We are telling students as undergrads or MA candidates that they have what it takes for a PhD, encouraging them as they pursue the PhD, supporting their dissertations as innovative new contributions, and then kicking them to the curb because we, as a field, aren't making a place for this next generation. The students Patrick does find for whom IR is a vocation are non-competitive on the job market from day 1 because of where they must go to school to do that kind of work, because of what the field expects from potential candidates, and because there are no jobs, not to mention jobs where you aren't required to cover a “service” section of intro to American or Stats.
If you want to do these kids a favor, a) stop admitting students to your PhD program and close it down and the b) open up a new tenure line each year for the next 3 years. If we could do that, it would be a much more 'rational' field. But we can't do that, which is why the PhD is such a poor decision for the unprepared.
*many other disciplines, particularly the lab sciences, are able to place PhDs in industry without forcing them to leave the lab. You can be a biochemist at a University or at Abbott labs and still be seen as a leading researcher. You can be a physicist for NASA and still be recognized by the academic community. Even economists will recognize some fellow economists in government or industry as still in the club. But IR is loath to do that–other than a few limited think tankers, there is no place to go when the Universities stop hiring. I agree with Patrick that the academy holds a unique role, but the academy is shrinking, and we need a place to keep people tied to the field so that the field doesn't loose their contributions as they seek health care and retirement savings and a salary big enough to support a kid and all that.