Other entries in the symposium–when available–may be reached via the “EJIR Special Issue Symposium” tag.
Terms such as core and periphery (or third world) are largely passé, and may even be conceptually and heuristically objectionable on the grounds that they are rooted in dichotomous language that reproduces power differentials between diverse actors and sites around the world. However, core-periphery like logics similar to those described by world-system and dependency theory in the 1960s and 1970s are still operational in multiple spheres of (globalized) human activity, including knowledge building. International Relations (IR) is no exception. Despite its lip-service to pluralism, and growing attempts to decolonize and decenter it by incorporating non-Western and peripheral readings of the world, IR remains fairly resilient to change. Why and how the field continues to exhibit and to recreate (neo) imperialist features has failed to engage both critical scholarship that underscores the power relations that play out in academia, and analysts of IR outside the West. The purpose of my article is to begin to fill this void by exploring the core-periphery dynamics that characterize the field of International Relations.
In the case of International Relations, I identify several kinds of placing strategy that seem to stand out: “fitting in”… “domination by invitation”… and “delinking.”
In order to do this, I make use of general insights provided by science studies. I find Bruno Latour´s work especially helpful because he approaches fields of scholarly inquiry as global networks that link distinct peripheries to “centres of calculation” in which data is created and processed, and theories are drafted. In doing so, Latour maps the intellectual division of labor that characterizes scientific enterprises across the globe. However, post-Kuhnian analyses such as his are less helpful for understanding how power accrued in the core translates into scientific (neo) imperialism, nor its effects upon knowledge-building in those sites that occupy the peripheral rungs of global disciplinary chains. I argue that instead of agent-less sites upon which power is enforced, peripheral scientific communities make use of distinct ploys in order to place themselves vis-à-vis core-periphery structures. In the case of International Relations, I identify several kinds of placing strategy that seem to stand out: “fitting in” (premised on acceptance of core domination and academic moves to gain recognition and position within existing core-periphery logics); “domination by invitation” (by which local state, academic or private sector elites conduct explicit campaigns to reinforce relations of domination with U.S. (or Western) bearers of knowledge in order to promote intellectual development); and “delinking” (which stakes out a position of difference outside of or in opposition to core IR). The fact that I am a participant in this special issue of the European Journal of International Relations, “speaking” from (but hopefully not for) the periphery despite my American origins, suggests that I am at least partially a “fitter inner”.
The core-periphery dynamics traced in science studies have also been documented in the social sciences, albeit to a lesser degree. Documents such as the UNESCO 2010 World Social Science Report (PDF) highlight severe asymmetries within and between countries and regions around the world in areas such as material and human resources, institutional conditions, and intensity and quality of research. Bibliometric analyses underscore the invisibility of the global South as measured by participation in internationally recognized peer reviewed journals and citation patterns. Peripheral scholars themselves reproduce asymmetries in this realm by referring overwhelmingly to core literatures. Language too acts to exclude those scholars whose main language of publication is not English. Finally, although some forms of social science, such as public advocacy or public research, are prevalent means of intellectual engagement in many peripheral sites, especially those that are inward-looking (as opposed to be internationally oriented), they are often considered “unscientific” and thus ill-suited for academic journals, with which their marginality is reinforced.
IR displays the same traits as those observed in the social sciences in general. However, the field’s political economy stands out due to its origins in a single country and to U.S. hegemony and domination over both academic production (in which the size and material resources of the academic community play no small role) and political practice. Thirty-five years after Stanley Hoffmann’s (PDF) depiction of International Relations as an American social science, some of its basic contours have changed surprisingly little. International relations textbooks continue to be written by American (and British) authors and rely upon Eurocentric representations in which the United States and Europe are at the center of world politics; publishing patterns in specialized IR journals indicate the pervasiveness of these same scholars; and IR teaching, especially in the area of theory, revolves largely around U.S. authored approaches. Equally disconcerting, the IR professoriate from 11 countries located outside of Europe and North America is similarly non-pluralist: the 2011 Teaching and Research in International Politics (TRIP) survey indicates that for these scholars too, not a single non-Anglo American has exerted the greatest influence on IR in the past 20 years, or produced the most interesting or best scholarship.
IR scholarship in the periphery is literally “boxed in” by a disciplinary structure within which attempts to overturn (neo) imperialist practices have been relatively futile.
One of the paradoxes that my article highlights is that the deeply rooted core-periphery logic that characterizes global International Relations, in which scholars and institutions from both are actively involved, makes operating from within the field somewhat counterproductive. IR scholarship in the periphery is literally “boxed in” by a disciplinary structure within which attempts to overturn (neo) imperialist practices have been relatively futile. Embracing a post-foundational definition of “science” falls short of disrupting the intellectual division of labor characteristic of IR. Strategies that acknowledge and embrace diversity are inadequate too because scientific cores are hard-pressed to recognize non-Western or Southern intellectual contributions as equals without undermining their own power, privilege and place in the world knowledge chain.
In short, accepting that the field of International Relations would be well served by making room for different know-hows scattered across a wide geocultural spectrum is insufficient to dismantle existing asymmetries. If knowledge of world politics as recounted by IR is (neo) imperialist and therefore, objectionable, the obvious question is whether or not moving beyond it – towards other fields of study, other places and other sources outside the university – may be a fruitful way forward. Although in this article I merely pose the question, the contributors to my and David L. Blaney´s Claiming the International (Routledge: 2013) engage it fully.
Editor’s Note: This is the 21st installment in our “End of IR Theory” companion symposium for the special issue of the European Journal of International Relations. SAGE has temporarily ungated all of the articles in that issue. This post refers to Tickner’s article (PDF). A response, authored by Naeem Inayatullah, will appear at 10am Eastern.
I really enjoyed this post and I am very interested in your ongoing project. Is it your view that the attempt to understand asymmetries and inequalities within world politics from within the discipline of international relations itself is not worthwhile as an endeavor? I note that you refer to ‘core-periphery like logics’ rather than just ‘core-periphery logics’ – you seem to resist embracing the wider structuralist perspective that, as Inayatullah notes, your claims seem to imply. Is this an intentional refusal to ‘do’ global inequality within the framework of the international relations discipline?
This was a very interesting and thought provoking article to read, thanks for that. Just a few comments.
First of all, the joining together of Latour and world systems theory needs to be taken with a fairly large pinch of salt. Latour has spent most of his career militating against macro-scale, top-down sociology of this kind. Although there are a couple of chapters of Science in Action that lend themselves to this kind of interpretation, in general Latour has been highly antagonistic to anything like this. He is emphatically a follower of Harold Garfinkel rather than Talcott Parsons – ethnomethodology forms the core of his sociology.
That said, even if this is a ‘misreading’ that isn’t necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it is shown to be productive and interesting. Still, I think it should be mentioned that Latour’s work is, in general, rather incompatible with world systems theory, even if some productive links can be drawn between the two.
With regard to ‘immutable mobiles,’ I think you might be understanding Latour a little incorrectly here:
“The fact that, for Latour, the application of science to the world consists of creating and extending networks from core to periphery highlights the power exercised by centers of calculation across wide geographical spaces and the ways in which scientific enterprises allow them to ‘possess’ the periphery. Contrary to the author’s claims, however, ‘immutables’ as such do not exist, given that knowledge is highly changeable, as Said’s (1983) idea of ‘traveling theory’ clearly suggests.”
The term ‘immutable mobile,’ in Latour’s usage, is intended to harbour an ironic contradiction. He does not claim that immutable mobiles stay the same as they move about; as they travel they are transformed – indeed, their transformations are what allow them to travel. There is no movement without translation and no translation without transformation – these are cardinal rules of Latour’s work since its earliest days. Immutable mobiles are indeed transformed as they are moved around the world, however they are transformed in very specific ways. Some parts of the thing are kept stable even as others are modified – some part of the Amazon rainforest remains in the stacks of papers back in France even if the trees, spiders, monkies, worms and so on have disappeared. The practices that keep elements of a thing stable while other elements of the thing are transformed is referred to as an ‘institution.’
So, for Latour, immutable mobiles don’t ever ‘stay the same’ as they’re moved around the world; inasmuch as they retain consistencies between translations this is due to institutions that are designed to ensure such constancy. The immutability of the mobile is strictly ‘relative’ both in the sense that it is partially and not absolutely immutable and in that it is only immutable in relation to processes that keep it this way. In short, I don’t think that the suppositions of ‘travelling theory’ are contrary to Latour’s claims at all. A minor point but one that stood out for me!
Lastly, I’d be interested to know whether ‘peripheral’ scholars see themselves as ‘dominated’ by the core. Of course, just because someone doesn’t see themselves as dominated doesn’t mean that they’re not but their perspective is surely a valid consideration. I imagine that some, particularly in the harder sciences, might reject the notion. If you believe in the humanist view of Science as a singular endeavour, a quest that transcends particularity and is owned by no one but humanity in general then the whole notion of core/periphery doesn’t quite work. More prosaically, where there are clearly defined metrics and standards for scientific practice that aren’t especially contested (and surely there are some, though not in IR) then one needn’t impart ‘peripheral’ interpretations upon the process of science but merely participate in the established protocols. In other words, belief in Science with a capital S tends to undo the core-periphery interpretation. Mathematics would be an interesting case since methods for validating mathematical proofs are supposed to be the most objective and impartial since either the proof works or it doesn’t (of course it’s not as simple as this, as sociologists of science have shown, but it’d make for an interesting comparative case nevertheless).
Please excuse my tardiness in posting this. I’m a bit behind in my reading.
This article was fascinating and very thought-provoking. I think my own brand of reflexivity is illuminated by it — both why I’m doing it, and perhaps what its limitations are. There is an inexorable quality to the way you lay out the structures of academic-discurisive power…which of course is as it should be, power is nothing if not relentless.
I think I always felt this inexorable quality — though not as sharply or clearly as you lay it out here (and now that I look back on it, it ties together your earlier work too). But I also realized I was the product of this approach to knowledge, and that to utterly ‘debarrass’ myself of it, would be akin to renouncing any systematic approach to thinking at all that didn’t begin from scratch (whatever that could mean…what would ‘bare thought’ be? Descartes holing himself up in his flat?) So there was, in my work, an “internal turn” — let’s critique our (this pronoun used in both in the collective sense and the individual one) appropriations as sharply as we do those of others.
I’m less comfortable with the next step, though; once we’ve made that decision within ourselves and we’ve done our self-accounting: how do we speak about politics, given that politics (esp in the ‘periphery’) is so much about scarcity and exclusion — ‘who gets what, where, and when’ is a much more poignant question in such circumstances. I don’t want to be a party to some new construction of power-knowledge; but I don’t want to let the constructions of others go unchallenged. In my own mind, I set myself up as a kind of critical epigone: “if you were REALLY committed to the values you profess, you’d be talking this way…” But that assumes a basic moral hypocrisy on which on can play. It works for Barack; not sure if it works for Pinochet, say.
I wonder what you’d do/have us do?