When I was in graduate school, my training included the methods and theories of international relations but also some of the epistemology and philosophy of science behind the sub-field. We discussed what makes a good research program and how can we tell if we’re making any progress in understanding the world. One of my advisors was a fan of Imre Lakatos’ approach, which looks at whether a research program is uncovering new novel facts or adjusting its initial claims to make up for discrepant observations.

My fellow graduate students and I suffered through the application of this debate to a few different areas of international relations. There’s the ongoing debate over the democratic peace, the debate over whether scientific rigor is ruining the policy applicability of international relations. There’s the debate over realism itself and a half-formed debate over constructivism.

As frustrating as this could get, at least scholars are trying. I tend not to see such self-reflection among foreign policy commentators. When they’re wrong they just tend to move on. There are occasional examples, like Stephen Walt’s piece on Trump’s second term. But they often feel like the exception.

In that spirit, I wanted to revisit one of my own policy commentaries. Specifically, the claim that rather than dragging us into war with Iran, the Gulf states are actually worried about the United States starting a war. Given their current stances on the Iran war, was I wrong?

Analyzing an earlier round of US-Iran tensions

In the first Trump administration, tensions with Iran intensified in 2019. The United States had reinstated sanctions on Iran after withdrawing from the Obama-negotiated JCPOA. Several tankers were struck by likely Iran-backed groups, and a US drone was shot down. Trump came close to authorizing a strike on Iran, but backed off although tensions continued, with the United States killing the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps early the next year.

Watching this, it seemed like an erratic United States was causing concern among our Gulf allies. I wrote something for the late Monkeycage in the Washington Post on Saudi Arabia’s secret talks with Iran as an attempt to defuse tensions and keep the United States from making things worse. I expanded on this on this site, tying it to debates about chain-ganging in alliance politics.

As the war progressed, the tone of Gulf state shifted

But I realized I was alone. Every other Middle East watcher argued the situation was reversed. Gulf states wanted the United States to take out Iran, and were annoyed we backed down. I stuck to my guns, however, and wrote something on this “sneaky” common wisdom that develops; everyone who claimed the opposite of me provided little evidence.

The Gulf states and the current war

That brings us to the current war. As experts have noted, this was not a war that the Gulf states pushed. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were not encouraging the United States to attack Iran. Israel may have been more supportive of the war (although not to the extent that conspiracy theories on the left and right suggest), but we’re focusing on the Gulf here.

Overall, maybe it’s not much of an exercise in academic humility if I asked if I was wrong and answered “no,” but…at least I asked?

So at first that made sense. As Iran’s neighbors, these US-aligned states worried what would happen if the United States started a fight with Iran. And they were right to worry, considering the attacks they’ve endured and the disruption to their economies.

As the war progressed, however, their tone shifted. They are now calling on the United States to continue the war until Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are destroyed. It is clear why: there’s a good chance Trump will declare victory and end the war in the hope oil prices go down. This would leave Gulf states with a hostile and unstable neighbor.

Was I wrong?

So that made me think of my initial argument. Obviously, this was a few years later and it’s possible the Gulf states wanted to restrain the United States then but now want Iran taken out. But an academic argument should be able to explain more than one observation.

I think I was generally right in that the initial impulse of Gulf states was to hope for US restraint. But their shifting stance indicates this wasn’t due to an attempt to establish ties with Iran at the expense of their US alignment. Instead, their primary concern has to be the erratic nature of US foreign policy under Trump, and a desire to manage that. That nuance wasn’t really clear in my initial take.

One could ask why any of this matters. It isn’t going to help stop this war or stabilize the Middle East afterwards. Part of it is that I just don’t think it’s useful for the Duck to have a generic “this war is bad” post, since you can find that elsewhere.

Part of it is that I think it will help. Marc Lynch and Shibley Telhami recently wrote-up the results from their latest survey on Middle East experts. They noted that about a third said the war would make Gulf states more likely to align with the United States. While that was an increase from before the war, it’s still a minority. Clearly there is disagreement about the motivations behind Gulf state alignment and how they view the risk of Iran versus the risk of war with Iran. Analyzing alignment shifts in past tensions can tell us a lot.

Overall, maybe it’s not much of an exercise in academic humility if I asked if I was wrong and answered “no,” but…at least I asked?